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Defoe and the Project of “Neighbours Fare”
JOANNE MYERS
GETTYSBURG COLLEGE
Before the long eighteenth century was “the Age of Reason” or “the Age 
of Enlightenment,” Daniel Defoe dubbed his “the Projecting Age.” A recent 
seminar at the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library and an accompany-
ing volume of essays on “The Age of Projects” have sought to reclaim Defoe’s 
title. Projecting’s vitality, Maximillian E. Novak points out, highlights the dy-
namism of the late Restoration and its “belief that human thought and action 
could transform history” (7). That dynamism is evident in the pages of Defoe’s 
Essay upon Projects, his ﬁrst signiﬁcant prose work, whose proposed reforms 
range from the revamping of highways and bankruptcy laws to the creation 
of benevolent societies and academies to improve the English language and 
educate soldiers and women. The Essay’s optimism is striking given that its 
publication followed hard on the heels of the failure of Defoe’s own schemes 
to farm civet cats and retrieve sunken treasure with the help of a diving bell. 
Though more extensive in scope than most projecting texts, the Essay’s ambi-
tion is nonetheless representative of the ﬂood of schemes that poured from the 
presses following the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1694-95, proposing 
everything from banks and lotteries to taxes on bedposts and libraries for the 
godless Scots. As a form of ad hoc social planning, projects form a lively part 
of the Restoration’s print marketplace.
Although ubiquitous, projects were viewed ambivalently by contempo-
raries. As Novak observes, the term “ project” for Restoration readers “had a 
distinctly unsavoury connotation, being associated with unscrupulous schemes 
for getting money” (3). Projecting was associated with Renaissance monopoly-
mongering and contemporary stock-jobbing. In Samuel Butler’s Characters, “A 
Projector” is said to prefer “the public Good before his own Advantage, until 
he has joined them both in some Monopoly, and then he thinks he has done 
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his Part, and may be allowed to look after his own Aﬀairs in the second Place” 
(116). Defoe was a committed projector all his life, lauding the marriage of 
“Invention” to the daughter of “Projector” in the pages of his Review and pub-
lishing An Eﬀectual Scheme for the Immediate Preventing of Street Robberies just 
months before he died, but he could lash projectors with the best of them. 
In The Complete English Tradesmen, he observes that “projectors … are indeed 
amongst tradesmen as birds of prey are amongst the innocent fowls, (viz.) 
devourers and destroyers” (31). When he put pen to paper to write the Es-
say, though, Defoe would have known not only that he would be suspected of 
ﬁnancial opportunism, but also that he ran the risk of inviting a further, more 
threatening accusation. Though Novak does not discuss it, one widespread ste-
reotype presented the projector as nothing more than a latter-day enthusiast. 
Conjuring the anarchic inspiration that had fuelled the civil wars, enthusiasm 
provokes deep anxiety in the Restoration, and its association with projecting is 
frequent. When Damaris Masham, Defoe’s near-contemporary, disparages the 
female seminary projected by Mary Astell in 1694, she charges that the plan 
“will turn to as wild an Enthusiasm as any that has been yet seen” (129). Jona-
than Swift, perhaps projecting’s most famous critic, alludes to the connection 
when The Tale of a Tub’s Lord Peter, elsewhere typed as an enthusiast, “cast[s] 
about to turn projector” (50).1 In later years, Defoe himself would be charged 
by one detractor of being a “Thrasonick Zoilus,” while another attacked the “Fa-
naticism” of his ﬁnancial proposals, demanding “How in the Name of Wonder 
shou’d this Creature know anything of Trade, unless it was by Inspiration?”2
Why does projecting evoke the specter of enthusiasm, and why does the 
practice nonetheless persist throughout the Restoration and into the eigh-
teenth century, which sees the publication of projects by Defoe, George Berke-
ley, and even Swift himself? This article uses Defoe’s Essay to begin to answer 
these questions and to explore how projecting matters in Defoe’s career and in 
the period more broadly. At the heart of a sophisticated projecting text such 
as the Essay, I argue, lies the desire to project not only individual improve-
ment schemes but, more broadly, a sociable subject who does not recede into 
mere particularity. The Essay’s varied schemes are united by their commitment 
to the proverbial “Neighbours Fare,” the notion that one’s own experiences 
and fortunes are inevitably bound to those of one’s fellows. Defoe introduces 
the idea when he argues early in the Essay that, unlike the “meer Projector,” 
the “honest Projector” is someone who will beneﬁt the nation by helping to 
establish a state in which “Plain English and Plain Dealing be practis’d indif-
ferently,” where “Tradesmen and Landed men shou’d have Neighbours Fare, as 
we call it” (ix). In the service of “Neighbours Fare,” the Essay promotes belief in 
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persons’ similitude, their capacity to be motivated and moved in like ways—in 
short, belief in their openness to being known.
This commitment to similitude, however, provokes fears of enthusiasm be-
cause it threatens to disturb the Restoration tendency to circumscribe knowl-
edge claims by attributing an indissoluble particularity, even privacy, to the 
experience that grounds those claims. Gaining in inﬂuence as the Restora-
tion wears on, this tendency was partly due, as Richard Kroll has shown, to 
a desire to restore an ethics of tolerance by emphasizing the contingency of 
knowledge claims (49-79). The skepticism that is a hallmark of Enlighten-
ment epistemology relies on the priority of experience to counter the kind 
of sweeping claims mounted by enthusiasts. The implicit individualism of the 
skeptical Enlightenment outlook registers not only in the rise of Baconian 
and Lockean empiricism but in the extension of empiricism’s experimental 
emphasis to the realm of religious experience and the development of a con-
sumer economy that privileges the claims of subjective desire.3 In emphasizing 
similitude rather than diﬀerence, the projector sets himself against important 
trends of his age and, like an enthusiast, threatens to inﬂict his views forcefully 
on others. Projectors characteristically plunge ahead with assertions about the 
common good that assume their ability to penetrate individual circumstances 
and dictate, with aggressive prescriptiveness—like the narrator of A Modest 
Proposal—what all should believe and do. As Lawrence E. Klein has argued, 
“enthusiasm” in this period can mean not only solipsistic obsession with private 
inspiration but also an excess of sociability (153-77), referred to later by Shaft-
esbury as “swarm[ing]” (358) in a phrasing echoed by Kant’s “schwärmerei” (38). 
The accusation of enthusiasm groups projectors with those who fail to respect 
the notion that the claims of competing beliefs must be carefully negotiated.
At the same time, projects’ persistence suggests a felt cultural need to resist 
what critics have tended to describe as the increasingly inward, even private 
characterization of belief, or its modulation into polite, non-dogmatic modes. 
The Essay, by contrast, both assumes and produces a vision of neighborliness 
predicated on the fundamental likeness or similarity of persons. If occasion-
ally the text betrays a Mandevillean impulse—“the Essential Ends of a Project,” 
Defoe insists at one point, involve “both Publick Good, and Private Advantage” 
(28)—overall the Essay makes the stronger case that individual interests are 
not merely complementary but are genuinely “equivalent.” This commitment 
to equivalence allows the text to imagine the nation as a self-similar space in 
which contingent diﬀerences are suspended by imaginative acts of connection. 
Defoe thus presses “Neighbours Fare” beyond metaphor to ﬁgure a proximity 
of persons that verges on their interchangeability.
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While most critics have been content to attribute contemporary disdain for 
projecting to its ties to ﬁnancial speculation, projecting’s perceived enthusiastic 
potential helps to explain the depth of negative feeling the practice evokes. The 
reaction against projecting is so excessive that it is hard to ascribe the problem 
to the opportunism of some garret-bound hacks. In using the Essay to explore 
the role that accusations of enthusiasm play in Restoration culture, this article 
builds on work by critics who have suggested that the charge of enthusiasm 
cannot be accepted as transparent, and that uncovering its polemical stakes can 
help to shed light on accounts of the self, social life, and the social role of belief 
that were marginalized in the transition to modernity. Work by Lawrence F. 
Klein and Anthony La Vopa, Jon Mee, and Paula McDowell has borne out J. 
G. A. Pocock’s insight that enthusiasm is “the antiself of Enlightenment”—not 
only a vestige of the coercive energies of the Civil War period, but a consti-
tutive other against which modernity deﬁnes itself.4 Our grasp of the stakes 
of charges of enthusiasm, McDowell suggests, has been limited because our 
critical paradigms tend not to be attuned to the contemporary ramiﬁcations of 
complex subjects like belief. It is easy to understand contempt for projectors-
as-stock-jobbers, but the danger posed by the projector-as-enthusiast is harder 
to appreciate. As Michael Heyd and others have shown, however, the charge 
of enthusiasm could be used strategically to dismiss uncongenial metaphysical 
claims. Unrecovered, such claims constitute what McDowell terms an “absent 
presence” in our understanding of the period (“Enlightenment Enthusiasms” 
518).
As a projector, Defoe cuts a somewhat unexpected ﬁgure. Critical focus on 
Defoe’s ﬁctional output often positions him at the vanguard of modernity, 
for his novels are often seen to endorse what has been typed as a distinctively 
modern pull towards individualism and skepticism. Yet as Peter Hulme 
notes, Defoe stands poised between two ages, seemingly at home in a 
secularizing enlightenment even as he remains steeped in an older vocabulary 
of sin, depravity, and grace (179). This article’s suggestion that we attend 
to his career as a projector builds on the considerable body of work that 
acknowledges tensions in representing him unproblematically as a modern 
ﬁgure.5 The “Neighbours Fare” promoted by the Essay implicitly—and 
sometimes literally—trespasses on the autonomy Defoe’s ﬁctional heroes 
and heroines are often seen to pursue. Though Defoe the projector has thus 
chieﬂy been an “absent presence” in critical accounts, he oﬀers us another way 
to bridge the gap between Defoe’s two worlds: neither an assured modern nor 
a retrograde enthusiast, he modernizes enthusiasm in order to imagine how 
persons can inhabit a space that lies between indissoluble particularity and 
enthusiastic collectivity.
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Neighbors and Strangers
Defoe surely had pragmatic motives for trying to press the case that pro-
jecting was publicly useful. If by the mid-1690s he was a reformed bankrupt, he 
was only a doubtfully reformed projector. An owner of a pantile manufactory, 
an enterprise tied to seventeenth-century monopoly projects, Defoe seems to 
have beneﬁted in 1696-7 from the patronage of Dalby Thomas, commissioner 
of the glass tax, a published projector, and the Essay’s dedicatee. Enlisting proj-
ects in the service of “Neighbours Fare” helps to deﬂect the charge of interest-
edness, and Defoe invokes the ideal speciﬁcally in the course of rebuking the 
wealthy. Funds raised by projecting, he argues, will oﬀset shortfalls in the land 
tax that have arisen because the rich have failed to pay their share. Appealing 
to this time-honored ideal of broad and sturdy sociability is an easy way, then, 
for Defoe to claim to serve the common good. But summoning the value of 
neighborliness is also salient in a historical moment when ideals of sociability 
are shifting away from the kind of intimacy that neighborliness connotes to-
wards what has been termed “an ethics of estrangement” (Warner 113).
Neighborliness, whether actual or potential, was of course a venerable ide-
al. As Sidney and Beatrice Webb noted, the parish-based system of poor relief 
that had long structured charity in England—and on which Defoe relies in 
his highway project—is grounded in the Christian imperative of almsgiving, 
which is in turn linked to the injunction to care for one’s neighbor as oneself 
(1-16). Implicit in such a system is the notion that one’s neighbor, as Matthew 
Hale puts it in 1688, “includes every Person, of what Relation, or Condition 
soever” (448). Contemporary explications of the parable of the good Samaritan, 
the classic Biblical text for deﬁning the scope of neighborliness, reinforce the 
concept’s breadth, showing “all man-kind to be so linked together by one com-
mon Nature, that every man in necessity is to be counted for a Neighbour, and 
the hand of reliefe to be reached out to him” (Rogers 2). To be a neighbor, then, 
is to be linked naturally and inevitably to one’s fellows, broadly conceived.
The dynamism of the Restoration, however, also provokes a reevaluation 
of how best to structure social ties and obligations.6 Lynn Hollen Lees has 
suggested that until about 1800 a consensus about the duty to be charitable 
remained widespread, keeping “strangers” in “solidarit[y]” with one another. Yet 
as early as 1670 Josiah Child characterizes the parochial system as “a radical Er-
ror” in the pursuit of poor relief (86). More broadly, conditions are shifting such 
that by 1761 Horace Walpole has to explain his traditionally expansive use of 
the term to a correspondent: “I shall irritate my neighbours,” he writes in one 
of the Oxford English Dictionary’s exemplary sentences, “I don’t mean those at 
next door, but in the scripture-sense of neighbour, anybody” (s.v. “neighbour”). 
Underlying these shifts, critics have proposed, is a more general reorientation 
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of public life around increasingly impersonal modes of exchange.7 As economic 
and political change made rank and status less deﬁnitive of one’s social posi-
tion, assumptions and institutions that had structured social relationships had 
to be renegotiated.8
Largely, the eﬀects of this reorientation have been seen as positive. In the 
realm of print, the democratizing, even liberating potential implicit in the pro-
duction of a “public sphere” that aids communication by disembedding partici-
pants from their particular circumstances has been widely heralded.9 Recently, 
though, critics have also stressed that one task of the emergent public sphere 
was to neutralize the threat of enthusiasm by ruling certain sorts of speaking 
out of bounds.10 One way to accomplish this end was to give participants in 
the public sphere ways to imagine themselves that would enable disinterested 
exchange. As Michael Warner has shown, “stranger sociability”—a general-
ized understanding of others as distant and diﬀerent from the self—is a key 
imaginative strategy for framing participation in the public sphere (105). The 
estrangement that such sociability assumes, Warner proposes, can be seen as a 
space of possibility: “An environment of strangerhood,” he writes, “is the neces-
sary premise of some of our most prized ways of being” (75). Warner does not 
explain the appeal of this “strangerhood” in light of contemporary fears about 
enthusiasm, but the premise of estrangement might well seem an attractive 
solution to the threat of enthusiastic coercion. By enforcing attention to the 
rhetoric of public address and thereby calling into question the enthusiast’s 
claim that the truth needs no mediation, an impersonal public sphere seems 
able to defuse much of that claim’s danger.
Nevertheless, even ﬁgures often seen as spokespersons for such a public 
sphere are not always sanguine about its “ethic of estrangement” (113). The 
Spectator is consistently seen to be key to the development of the public sphere, 
but in its pages Mr. Spectator can be found lamenting that the world is riddled 
with “Disguise and Imposture,” such that “you hardly see one who is not, as 
the Player is, in an assumed Character” (594). The trope is familiar, but Mi-
chael Ketcham has suggested that its prevalence in the Spectator is designed to 
compensate for uncertainty about the basis of what he terms “social knowl-
edge” in the period (63). Ketcham argues that one of the Spectator’s key aims 
is to strengthen such knowledge by teaching readers how to overcome “the 
dichotomy of inside and outside” that the paper often highlights (63). De-
spite its misgivings, the Spectator clearly disseminates a politeness in which 
are embedded all kinds of social distance. Clement Hawes, though, has de-
scribed the persistence through this period of a “manic style” that aims to 
preserve “a transindividual framework” for conceiving social personality (14). 
Such traces of competing models of public address suggest that the emergence 
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of an impersonal realm of public discourse was not wholly uncontested, and 
that accounts emphasizing a ready movement towards, in McDowell’s words, 
“bourgeois individualism and secular reason,” simplify actual conditions on the 
ground (Women of Grub Street 22). Warner stresses the emancipatory potential 
of stranger sociability, but contemporary voices also hint at what gets lost when 
neighbors become estranged.
Defoe’s own standing in the marketplace of print and a secular “public 
sphere” is ambiguous. While John Richetti describes Defoe as “prominent 
among those who articulate what has come to be called the bourgeois public 
sphere” (70), he also points out that the controversy over his Shortest Way with 
Dissenters highlights the limits of such a putatively public sphere to encompass 
genuine diﬀerence of opinion (470).11 Defoe wrote a number of oft-neglected 
books in which he appears more reactionary than progressive: in Mere Nature 
Delineated, he protests the eclipse of religious mystery by secular reason, chid-
ing readers for being “Ante-Enthusiastick”: “As to that Truth called Religion, 
I reckon no time at all to that Part,” he grumbles, “in which I know I please 
many of my Sceptical, Deistical, Ante-Enthusiastick Readers” (83). Though 
hyperbolic, Defoe’s comment places him at a more skeptical distance from his 
age than Mary Poovey allows when she characterizes the Essay as a modern-
izing text that is ahead of its time in theorizing “government by taste” (160). 
For Poovey, the chief burden of the Essay is to manage rather than coordinate 
“the subjective responses of individuals,” responses whose divergence is both 
inevitable und unproblematic (158). From this perspective, the Essay’s invoca-
tion of “Neighbours Fare” might look like a ploy, an opportunistic gesture not 
especially uncharacteristic of Defoe. Nevertheless, elsewhere in Defoe’s works, 
and even in his ﬁction—where the critical consensus has been that he appears 
the most “modern”12—we can see traces of uneasiness about the modern po-
tential for estrangement. Though Ian Watt argues that Robinson Crusoe fails 
adequately to convey the costs of isolation, he still identiﬁes in its paradigmatic 
hero “an anguished sense of personal loneliness” (91) that is echoed in H.F’s 
isolation in plague-stricken London in A Journal of the Plague Year. The pursuit 
of Roxana by her daughter Susan typiﬁes the way that Defoe’s ﬁctional pro-
tagonists are also often haunted by the social ties they otherwise seem eager to 
evade. In what follows, I will argue that, despite the real attractions for Defoe 
of individualism and even “strangerhood,” the important place of projecting in 
his career allows us to see his real if not uncomplicated interest in conserving a 
genuinely “Neighbourly” sensibility.
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Neighborliness and “Speaking Sense”
In context, the Essay’s call for “Neighbours Fare” advances the argument 
that projecting can restore continuity among private interests. As the argument 
develops, it becomes clear that Defoe thinks “Neighbours Fare” will arise only 
through acts of relationship in which individuals hold one another responsible 
for the good of the whole. In working to produce a mutuality that is its own 
reward, the Essay implicitly resists an instrumental account of social life as 
simply a means to gratify one’s private ends. Though Kimberly Latta proposes 
that the Essay “foreshadows the … view that individual avarice could actually 
promote the common good,” the text does not always look anachronistically 
Mandevillean (144). In the project for a language academy, the Essay proposes 
that fostering “Plain English” is a shared undertaking that also supports so-
cial life. In this scheme, Defoe’s outrage over the corruptions of contemporary 
speech and his insistence on the need for “speaking Sense” both indicate that 
here the Essay is fundamentally concerned not with the tension between the 
individual and society but with the pressure exerted on claims of shared value 
by the relativizing dynamics of the market.
Justifying his call for an academy to regulate language, Defoe laments the 
poverty of modern conversation, highlighting for special scorn the prevalence 
of profanity in daily speech. In a text peppered with commentary on various 
social ills, Defoe expresses a singular outrage over debased conversation. The 
speech of his contemporaries, Defoe storms, is “a mere Frenzy of the Tongue, 
a Vomit of the Brain, which works by putting a Contrary upon the Course of 
Nature,” and must be accounted as “Folly acted for the sake of Folly, which is 
a thing even the Devil himself don’t practice” (247-48). The man who swears 
“makes Conversation unpleasant,” but more seriously he renders “Discourse 
… perfect Nonsense” (240-41). Tacitly invoking a linguistic rule of “Nature” 
and “sense,” the argument turns its attention to “speaking Sense,” a concept 
that mediates between mere “Custom” and the “Truth” to serve as a standard 
and rule for social intercourse. In her reading of the Essay, Poovey argues that 
the language academy project cannot point to “an obvious linguistic marker 
of diﬀerence” between sense and nonsense (165), a lack that betokens “the 
limit of epistemological resources available to the would-be theorist of human 
motivation at the turn of the eighteenth century” (163). For Poovey, Defoe 
is already in a Mandevillean world that forecloses appeal to values or norms 
that transcend individual interest. But in the language academy project Defoe 
relies on a resource beyond “Custom”: “Sense,” which marks the place at which 
individuals bring truth into the world of conversation. The Essay focuses not 
so much on managing “Custom” as bringing it under the government of this 
“Sense.” “There is a direct Signiﬁcation of Words, or a Cadence in Expression, 
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which we call speaking Sense,” Defoe writes; “this, like Truth, is sullen and the 
same, ever was and will be so, in what manner, and in what Language soever ’tis 
express’d” (244). Here, truth transcends but also checks speech, guiding con-
versation away from “perfect Nonsense.” And to do so, truth must be realized in 
“speaking”: the context is interpersonal, relational.
The Essay’s attention to “speaking Sense” thus rebukes the authority of 
custom by an appeal to language’s social uses. “’Tis true,” Defoe notes,
Custom is allow’d to be our best Authority for Words, and ’tis ﬁt it 
should be so; but Reason must be the Judge of Sense in Language, 
and Custom can never prevail over it. Words, indeed, like Ceremonies 
in Religion, may be submitted to the Magistrate; but Sense, like the 
Essentials, is positive, unalterable, and cannot be submitted to any 
Jurisdiction; ’tis a law to it self, ’tis ever the same, even an Act of 
Parliament cannot alter it. (243)
Defoe’s argument thus takes away as much as it gives to “Custom,” and the 
appeal to “Sense” restores a normative understanding of how speech can body 
forth “Essential” truth. Poovey suggests that the Essay elsewhere undermines 
such assertions by appealing to relativizing market dynamics (164). Yet the 
argument that an act of “direct Signiﬁcation” allows words to approximate and 
thus become equivalent to or indistinguishably “like” the truth foreshadows the 
highway project’s use of proximity to ﬁgure likeness. This overlap between the 
two projects betokens the Essay’s commitment to connecting persons in ways 
that are not merely instrumental. Put another way, the Essay can here be seen 
to suggest ways in which persons really are connected despite the dissociating 
forces of an emerging market economy. If sense is like the truth to the extent 
that it is partly indiﬀerent to context—it “is positive, unalterable”—it is only 
realizable in a context, through its performance in “a Cadence in Expression.”
The contextual, interpersonal nature of “Sense” helps to illuminate why 
Defoe is so exercised by profanity. The free ﬂow of “Nonsense” renders public 
life sterile, a pure but pointless performance that suspends attention to the 
common good. As the project develops, Defoe is clearly exasperated by the fact 
that people have refused to rein in the problem by insisting on the exchange 
of “Sense” and have instead allowed “a superﬂuous crowding in of insigniﬁcant 
Words” (245). In so doing, they have behaved not as “Neighbours” united by a 
shared sense of value, but self-interested agents in love with their own “Folly.” 
The Essay protests against lewd speech’s breach of “Good Manners” (246) and, 
in a brief foray into verse, Defoe laments that “few are Sound and Orthodox:/
They hate Conformity, tho’ ’tis in Vice” (251). If Defoe could inveigh against 
occasional conformity in his religious pamphlets, here conformity in mannerly 
10 Restoration 35.2  
speech emerges as a positive solidarity against “Vice.” The language academy’s 
attempt to rescue social life from degradation by preserving the force of “Sense” 
proposes that our shared life together both demands and enables a shared com-
mitment to values that are not idiosyncratic and that must have a real purchase 
on behavior. If strangers might let one another get away with “Folly acted for 
the sake of Folly,” neighbors should not.
Equivalence and the Highways Project
If the neighborliness that can sponsor sensible, truthful conversation is a 
key concept for the Essay, how is it to be made thinkable? Producing neigh-
borliness by imagining both land and persons as fundamentally “equivalent” 
is the chief burden of the highways project. To be sure, the Essay focuses on 
the material beneﬁts that will accrue from widening, re-grading, and ditching 
the highways. The scheme, however, also reveals an underlying commitment 
to producing a certain kind of subject: a fundamentally social person whose 
neighborliness is deﬁned not only by his imagined proximity to others but 
also by his ultimate commensurability with them. In this project, “equivalence” 
mediates diﬀerence as “Sense” mediates the exchange of truth in the language 
academy scheme. Equivalence is the assertion of identity across diﬀerence; it is 
a functional identity for which diﬀerence is not insuperable, not a sign of iden-
tity’s failure. To achieve equivalence, sameness must be discerned within ap-
parent diﬀerence. Like sense in the earlier project, equivalence in the highways 
project is thus inextricable from relationships. Producing equivalence requires 
relying on a social and even imaginative commitment to see how particulars 
can be linked for the sake of the common good.
Perhaps the Essay’s most ambitious project, the scheme to rehabilitate the 
nation’s roads was certainly needed, for “the condition of England’s highways 
was abominable and the administration of their rates and repairs hopeless.”13 
Problems with the roads continued to preoccupy Defoe: he laments their con-
dition most famously in the appendix to the second volume of his Tour Thro’ the 
whole Island of Great Britain, in which he describes the “deep stiﬀ clay, or marly 
kind” of ground prevalent in the Midlands to be “so surprisingly soft that it is 
perfectly frightful to travelers,” producing “sloughs and holes, which no horse 
could wade through” (429, 435). While this may sound dire, economic histori-
an John A. Chartres emphasizes that Defoe’s commitment to reforming rather 
than simply documenting the wretched state of England’s roads is a bright 
spot in the “almost unremitting gloom” that pervades seventeenth-century ac-
counts of the highways (73). When Defoe was writing, only a single turnpike 
authority had been established, on the New Great North Road in 1663, and 
the heyday of turnpike development—which Defoe would hail in the Tour as 
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“worth recording, for the honour of the present age”—was still to come (qtd. 
Albert 140). The Essay does not itself promote turnpikes; early in the project, 
Defoe observes that “Tolls and Impositions upon Passengers and Travellers” 
are one evil his proposal seeks to mend (69). Nevertheless, the project does 
seek to mitigate the problem of parochialism in the upkeep of the nation’s 
highway system. Since Tudor times, control of both the funds and manpower 
for highway maintenance had lain with local parishes, and their ability and 
eﬀorts were uneven.14 The Essay proposes expanding the government’s ability 
to enforce maintenance standards, a recourse to authority that, Poovey sug-
gests, signals Defoe’s imperfect grasp of how to regulate an economy of taste 
(159-64). When he sets out to describe the value of the project, however, what 
Defoe emphasizes is not its ability to further individual interests but the fact 
that it “promotes universal Correspondence” (73). In the highways project, the 
promotion of trade also promotes a vision in which everyone is “Neighbour” 
to everyone else.
The England imagined in the highways project is not fractured by local 
interest but united by its inhabitants’ underlying likeness. That likeness is both 
manifested in what the scheme describes as their common interest and pro-
duced by the very highway system proposed. The goal of a “universal Cor-
respondence” of persons is actually carried over from a prior project in the 
Essay, a scheme for a network of county banks. In that project, Defoe imagines 
a strong central bank and a series of “many Banks [that] cou’d without clash-
ing maintain a constant Correspondence” (58). The commensurability of local 
interests extends to the commensurability of persons as Defoe speculates that, 
in a nation integrated by systems of exchange,
A man who has Cash at Plymouth, and wants Money at Berwick, may 
transfer his Cash at Plymouth to Newcastle in half an hours time. … Or 
if he wants Money at Newcastle, and has Goods at Worcester, or at any 
other Clothing-Town, sending his Goods to be sold by the Factory of 
the Bank of Worcester, he may remit by the Bank to Newcastle, or any 
where else, as readily as if his Goods were sold and paid for. (62-63)
If the person here envisioned is in essence the man who can be anywhere that 
business demands because his cash ﬂows freely through the improved banking 
system, that man’s speciﬁcity is partly suspended as the Essay allows readers to 
imagine that “corresponding” persons as well as funds are located at each node 
of the network. Here, local speciﬁcity cannot eﬀace underlying likeness—so 
that, in eﬀect, a man at Berwick might as well be a man at Plymouth as a man 
at Worcester.
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The banking project, though, may seem to leave open the possibility that 
this dissolution of individual speciﬁcity is driven by a desire for proﬁt, thus 
raising questions about the Essay’s instrumental use of ideals of commonality. 
As the highways project develops, however, its emphasis on “equivalence” calls 
into question its commitment to private interest as it dwells on resemblance 
and continuity rather than diﬀerence. Equivalence in the Essay is not quite 
identity, but it does imply a larger logic of commensuration. Equivalence per-
vades the highways project, underlying the massive transubstantiation of mat-
ter that Defoe envisions when he proposes
That an Act of Parliament be made, with Liberty for the Undertakers 
to Dig and Trench, to cut down Hedges and Trees, or whatever is 
needful for ditching, dreining, and carrying oﬀ Water, cleaning, 
enlarging, and leveling the Roads, with Power to lay open or inclose 
Lands; to incroach into Lands, dig, raise, and level Fences, plant and 
pull up Hedges or Trees, for the enlarging, widening, and dreining the 
High-Ways, with Power to turn either the Roads, or Water-Courses, 
Rivers and Brooks, as by the Directors of the Works shall be found 
needful, always allowing satisfaction to be ﬁrst made to the Owners of 
such Lands, either by assigning to them equivalent Lands, or Payment 
in Money . . . . (75)
Here at the outset of the project, two assumptions about equivalence appear 
that go on to structure its development. First, land can apparently be worked 
on such a scale in part because it is conceived of as everywhere “equivalent” to 
itself, so that there is no parcel of land for which a substitute cannot be found. 
Embedded in that assumption is the further suggestion that persons themselves 
can agree on the “equivalence” of their situations, so that “Owners” will “always” 
accept the compensation oﬀered for their contribution to the greater good.
While this introduction to the project showcases Defoe’s trademark atten-
tion to particulars, that particularism is balanced by a commensurating view of 
how individual parts of the nation, the raw materials for the project, and even 
persons themselves, can be networked into a uniﬁed and cooperative whole. 
Further equivalences are repeatedly implied and entailed: part of the “Stock” of 
the project, the resources it needs to get underway, “must be Hands: for a Stock 
of Men is a Stock of Money” (81); to raise funds, “every County, City, Town, 
and Parish, shall be Rated at a Set Price, equivalent to Eight Years Payment 
for the Repair of High-Ways” (81); to hasten construction, criminal punish-
ments “might be easily transmitted to a certain number of Days Works on the 
High-Ways” (82); and farmers unable to fulﬁll their annual obligation to lend 
out horses and equipment for a whole week to assist the project “may spare 
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it at sundry times, or agree to be Assess’d, and pay the Assessment at sundry 
payments” (91-92). Moreover, “the Work of the Farmers’ Teams…must be ac-
counted as Money, and is equivalent to it” (93). The project will employ both 
the able-bodied poor and those unﬁt for labor: “to those who cannot work,” the 
works’ supervisors “may allow Pensions for Overseeing, Supervising, and the 
like, which will be more than Equivalent” to a paying job (83).
By returning to the theme of equivalence, the Essay resists making diﬀer-
ence central to the identity of either the nation or its inhabitants. Instead, the 
project describes persons in a way that presupposes a context of relationship 
and imaginative exchange. As “Sense” had bridged the gap between “Truth” 
and “Custom,” “equivalence” bridges the absolutes of identity and non-identity 
implicit in the highways project. To do so, though, requires seeing persons 
in relation to one another: as a functional identity, equivalence requires some 
sort of agreement to render ostensibly diﬀerent things like; as an imaginative 
identity, it requires both a perceiver and a context for its discernment. Several 
times, the highways project invokes such imaginative equivalences. Describing 
how to render wasteland useful, Defoe describes how “in most places there is a 
convenient distance of Land left open” on the roads’ shoulders, “which though 
it be us’d of course by Cattle and Travellers on occasion, is indeed no Beneﬁt 
at all either to the Traveller as a Road; or to the Poor as a Common, or to the 
Lord of the Mannor a Waste” (79-80). Proposing to ﬁnance his scheme by 
improving this land for sale, Defoe argues that it is “as good Land as any of the 
Neighbouring Enclosures, as capable of Improvement, and to as good purpose” 
(80). Here, the proposed conversion of nothing into something via its potential 
to be like something—“as capable of Improvement”—requires an eye that can 
see similitude. Once imaginatively grasped, that similitude can then perpetuate 
the ongoing conversion of only apparently disparate particulars into an inte-
grated whole structured by a series of equivalences.
If parcels of land can be made equivalent, and if people, money, and forms 
of work are also presumed to be commensurable, what about persons them-
selves? The assumption that landowners will readily surrender their land in 
exchange for “equivalent” acreage or payment implies an equivalence of mo-
tives: the Essay consistently assumes that “satisfaction” can be achieved because 
no residual private interest allows individuals to hive themselves oﬀ from the 
shared aim of improving the nation. Towards the beginning of the project, 
Defoe acknowledges that “the liberty” of the project’s overseers to appropriate 
land “seems very large, and some may think ’tis too great a Power to be granted 
to any Body of Men over their Neighbours” (76-77). Nevertheless, he argues, 
the scale of appropriation “is absolutely necessary, or the Work cannot be done; 
and the doing of the Work is of much greater Beneﬁt than the Damage can 
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amount to.”  To supplement this utilitarian response, he continues, “Satisfac-
tion to be made to the Owner…is an Unquestionable Equivalent” (77). To 
a skeptical reader, the “Unquestionable” nature of such “Equivalen[ce]” may 
seem doubtful. But the project does assume that all persons can achieve an 
“Equivalent” position from which they can perceive its “Beneﬁt.” By re-invok-
ing the argument that all men are “Neighbours” exactly when he admits that 
the project requires that some men be granted authority over others, Defoe 
emphasizes that the project aims to sustain rather than infringe on the prin-
ciple of equity.
Later, the equivalence of land again shades into the stronger claim of per-
sons’ equivalence in a further but more perplexing argument about compensa-
tion. As it imagines how grants of improved wasteland might serve to com-
pensate those who have lost acreage, the Essay seems to envision the country 
as a ﬂuid space in which everywhere is proximate. The improved land, Defoe 
points out, “will be either saleable to raise Money, or ﬁt to exchange with those 
Gentlemen who must part with some Land where the Ways are narrow” (80-
81). The assumption here seems to be that newly-arable land will always be 
convenient to—both near and useful to—individuals who lost land to the ex-
pansion of the roads. The speciﬁcity of persons and their interests is again ef-
faced by their imagined mobility within a more or less uniform space, and the 
residual diﬀerences that might make a man at Norwich unhappy about being 
granted substitute lands in Norfolk are eclipsed. Mere proximity, or nearness, 
the most basic form of resemblance, here seems to entail a further nearness of 
motives.15
If the Essay’s focus on proximity helps it to elide diﬀerence between dis-
tances of both geography and motive, at times the text is more open about the 
extent to which it relies on imaginative acts of relation. At such moments, the 
Essay seems to want to cultivate in its readers analogical habits of thought: 
analogy, Foucault points out, develops from convenientia, marking the point at 
which relations grounded on “visible, substantial” likeness become conceptual 
(21). Analogy in the Essay further secures places’ and persons’ equivalence. Ear-
ly in the project, Defoe hopes that a place can be found to serve “as a Pattern 
and Experiment for the whole Kingdom” (74). When the Essay later describes 
the town of Islington, the area initially seems singularly unqualiﬁed to serve 
such a paradigmatic role. The town is hampered by “the inconvenience of a 
Clayey Ground, and no Gravel at hand,” and its “wholly Unpassable” stretches 
of cross-roads seem to render it “a Place, that has not its Fellow in the King-
dom” (86-87). Yet despite these diﬃculties, Defoe does not abandon the at-
tempt to make the town exemplary. Rather, he goes on to show how “a noble 
Magniﬁcent Causeway might be erected” in the town, transforming Islington 
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into a “Pattern” after all. As the argument develops, Islington’s exceptionalism 
subsides so that the parish can be re-ﬁgured as a kind of anywhere. Though 
the town’s promise “as a Pattern” would seem empirically dubious, the project 
makes an imaginative leap—“as”—that transcends doubt. Elsewhere, the Essay 
further resists conceding to the pull of diﬀerence when it contracts the nation 
into a space that, if not everywhere identical, is everywhere familiar: if the proj-
ect succeeds, Defoe writes, “a Man might Travel over all England as through 
a Street” (84). The poetic force of the simile proposes the synecdochic status 
of any particular place, rendering all men, at bottom, “Neighbours” in a nation 
conceived as a single “Street.” England here becomes a place in which people 
are ordered but also joined by their equivalence.
Conclusion
While the Essay is primarily committed to imagining sociability, the risk 
of estrangement does haunt the text’s edges. In several schemes, the Essay 
certainly seems committed to distinguishing or “sorting” persons according 
to contingencies of their circumstances, raising the possibility that diﬀerence 
plays a more signiﬁcant role in the text than my focus on equivalence might 
suggest. The proposals for insurance societies, for example, tend to begin with a 
focus on distinguishing types of persons: a friendly society, Defoe writes, must 
admit “None…but whose Circumstances are, at least in some degree, alike, and 
so Mankind must be sorted into Classes; and as their Contingences diﬀer, every 
Diﬀerent Sort may be a Society upon even terms”; thus, “’tis necessary to sort 
the World into Parcels” (118-20). Here, the comprehensive view of society in 
the highways project seems to break down as the Essay encounters “Circum-
stances” insoluble into equivalence. It is worth noting, however, that “Contin-
gences” are a problem to be overcome throughout the Essay, not a condition to 
be borne with, much less celebrated. The proposal for a general “Pension-Of-
ﬁce” opens with an invitation to “all Sorts of People” to register themselves, a 
call that at once acknowledges and brackets diﬀerence.
In a slightly diﬀerent vein, the Essay elsewhere works to reassert “Sorts” 
or categories of persons, as in the project for a “Court of Enquiries,” whose 
aim is to prevent “Honest” debtors from being driven “into the Friars” or the 
Mint, “those Nurseries of Rogues,” and being mistaken for “Knavish, Design-
ing” debtors (206). Here, sorting restores the visibility of character threatened 
by laws that reward cunning. Producing character’s visibility in this way may 
feel compensatory, as if the Essay aims at a kind of social engineering that, in 
Frances Ferguson’s words, will oﬀer “a description of individuality that is not 
so much expressed as produced” (1164). A debtor, for example, can show his 
“Honest[y]” by registering his name with the court of enquiries and by surren-
16 Restoration 35.2  
dering his account books for scrutiny. Here, the Essay’s “Sorts” or classes might 
seem to “become instruments of individuation rather than their signs” (Fergu-
son 1162). Elsewhere in the Essay, however, the claim is that persons’ essential 
equivalence allows them to function as the authentic signs of one another; the 
sociability thus imagined is not merely a productive ﬁction but serves persons’ 
genuine connectedness. Even in the bankruptcy project, character preexists its 
rescue. The Essay overall seems committed to the proposition asserted late in 
the text that “the whole Diﬀerence in Mankind proceeds either from Acci-
dental Diﬀerence in the Make of their Bodies, or from the foolish Diﬀerence of 
Education” (299). Equivalence here precedes and preempts the diﬀerences that 
can produce an experience of estrangement.
Diﬀerence thus emerges in the Essay as an ultimately contingent factor that 
is not central to identity. Taking the Essay as a representative project suggests 
that projects’ signiﬁcance may well rest on their commitment to an imagina-
tive belief in the individual’s likeness to others—a belief increasingly ruled out 
of bounds as anxieties about enthusiasm shape accounts of sociability that, by 
privileging strangeness, structure social life around diﬀerence and distinction. 
To the extent that it implicitly acknowledges the costs of premising social life 
on estrangement, the Essay is indeed representative of more sophisticated pro-
jecting texts. Defoe the projector seems ready to accept the possibility that the 
text will be received as enthusiastic. His Essay suggests that Restoration readers 
did not only need to learn how to cope with alienation or how to manage con-
ﬂicts between private interests, but that they also turned to texts—projects—
that could provide strategies for imagining a life amongst one’s “Neighbours,” 
persons not identical but equivalent to the not-so singular self.
Notes
1Though associated during the Civil War era with radical sectarianism, by the 
1690s, when Swift likely composed the Tale, “enthusiasm” was a general smear word 
as readily linked to Peter’s Roman Catholic dogmatism. Catholicism was often 
characterized as an example of the “superstition” that was enthusiasm’s complement, 
but it could be linked directly to enthusiasm as well. See Heyd 72-92. 
2Rogers 35-6. The comments appear, respectively, in a pamphlet attributed by 
Rogers to John Clark, A Paper concerning Daniel De Foe (Edinburgh, 1708), and the 
pamphlet Remarks on a Scandalous Libel, Entitil ’d A Letter … Relating to the Bill of 
Commerce (London, 1713), sometimes attributed to John Oldmixon (Rogers 33).
3On Defoe and Bacon, see Vickers. On the eﬀects of modern epistemology on 
religious understandings of the self, see Branch. On the role of desire in the early 
modern economy, see Poovey 157-61.
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4Jon Mee argues that, as the eighteenth century developed, “enthusiasm had 
become available for making sense of any popular phenomenon, religious or otherwise, 
deemed threatening by the cultural hegemony of the Anglican Church and the broader 
culture of politeness in the eighteenth century” (27). Klein and La Vopa note that 
“[c]laims about reason, philosophy and Enlightenment were not used simply to deﬁne 
what constituted knowledge; they identiﬁed who could claim knowledge, who had 
cognitive authority, who could speak and write, and what kind of speech and writing 
were normative in the public world” (4).
5See for example Novak, Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe. John Richetti 
acknowledges “a key tension in Defoe’s life and mind between an early form of secular 
modernity and quite strongly held orthodox Christian beliefs,” though he argues that 
Defoe’s secularism is “dominant” (8, 172). Carol Houlihan Flynn describes Defoe as 
“dreamer laureate of a capitalist system that he found too hard to manage” (79).
6For a discussion of the shifting languages of public welfare in this period, see 
Slack 77-125.
7See for example Agnew.
8See McKeon xix-xxiii, 342-7.
9The most inﬂuential account is Habermas.
10See Mee 10-11.
11See also Acosta, who characterizes the Dissenting Academies as “an alternative 
public sphere able to allow for rational Dissent” (15).
12See McKeon, Origins of the English Novel 120, where he notes the presence “in 
writers of exceptional acuity” of “the autonomous aesthetic and the idea of realism,” 
using Defoe as an example.
13See Kennedy, Seidel, and Novak, xxvii-xxix.
14See Albert 14-29.
15For a discussion of the forms of order and their relation to one another, see 
Foucault 50-8, 72-3. Foucault argues that modernity is deﬁned by a preference for 
orders based on acts of diﬀerentiation, and that the residual desire for similitude can 
look “visionary” (47).
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